Between the Mandate and Security Tension: Eisenkot's First Days

Days after receiving the mandate to form a government from President Herzog, Gadi Eisenkot is fighting a dual battle: complex attempts to assemble a coalition alongside a frontal clash with outgoing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu (the Guardian, 2026a; cnn.com, 2026; president.gov.il, n.d.). Eisenkot, head of the 'Yashar' party, is demanding full transparency in security matters and has even appealed to the Attorney General to order Netanyahu to update him on sensitive issues (מעריב — מבזקים, 2026a; מקור ראשון, 2026; Jerusalem Post — front page, 2026c). Conversely, Netanyahu accuses Eisenkot of attempting to politicize the defense establishment during a period requiring stability against external threats such as Iran (Jerusalem Post — front page, 2026i; JDN, 2026a).

The current political situation is a result of the October 2026 elections, where no bloc achieved the coveted 61-seat majority (the Guardian, 2026a; arabnews.jp, 2026). Eisenkot, who resigned from the government in June 2024 due to criticism of war management and the influence of political considerations on strategic decisions, emerged in these elections as the primary candidate for a change in government (britannica.com, n.d.-b). Having lost his son Gal and two nephews during the war, he built his campaign around values of accountability, statehood, and the demand for a state commission of inquiry to examine failures since Operation Protective Edge (כאן 11, 2026b; 24 Channel, n.d.).

In a broader view, Eisenkot's path reflects the shift since his time as the 21st Chief of Staff (2015-2019), when he led distinct military strategies such as 'mowing the grass' and the Dahiyeh Doctrine (www.idf.il, n.d.; britannica.com, n.d.-a). His transition from military command to the political arena in 2022 and the founding of the 'Yashar' party stemmed from a sense of urgency to repair state institutions (wikipedia.org, n.d.; thefederal.com, 2026). Today, his political influence relies on the ability to bridge between rival camps, but the challenge remains the contrast between his desire for a national emergency government and the fractured parliamentary reality created after the latest elections (מעריב — מבזקים, 2026b; TIME, 2026).

An angle often sidelined in the headlines is Eisenkot's reliance on the votes of Arab-majority parties, a move creating internal tension within the change bloc itself (Jerusalem Post — front page, 2026e; ynet — חדשות, 2026b). While concerns exist within the Arab public regarding Eisenkot's policy positions, coalition negotiations are encountering barriers from Jewish partners who fear reliance on Ra'am and the Joint List (Amar Ujala, 2026; Jerusalem Post — front page, 2026e; ynet — חדשות, 2026c). Attempting to form a 'government of repair' requires Eisenkot to make far-reaching compromises, leading to calls from politicians like Lieberman to abandon the Arab partnership in exchange for courting the Haredi parties (Jerusalem Post — front page, 2026b; ynet — חדשות, 2026c; רשת 13, 2026b).

The open question remains whether Eisenkot will succeed in completing the task of forming a government within his 28-day window, or if structural disputes will lead to a stalemate (cnn.com, 2026; the Guardian, 2026b). While Netanyahu works to halt the move through political means, Eisenkot continues to issue warnings against unusual military maneuvers that could drag Israel into unnecessary escalation (בחדרי חרדים, 2026a; ynet — חדשות, 2026a; סרוגים, 2026b). As time passes, expectations for the proposed government grow, but the distance between the promise of change and the practical ability to lead a country without a solid majority remains significant (כאן 11, 2026a; בחדרי חרדים, 2026b).